Abstract-With the development of Internet computing tech-to the ADVFN real-time stock streaming services need to niques, continuous data streams from remote sites are commonly be certain that the received stock prices are from ADVFN used in scientific and commercial applications. Correspondingly, and they have not been modified during the transmission. In there is increasing demand of assuring the integrity and authen- 
I. INTRODUCTION
To be able to detect any lost packet or data block, existing
The proliferation of the Internet has enabled more and stream data authentication schemes mainly rely on hash chainmore scientific and commercial applications to use continuous ing when generating the MIAC. Most of these schemes [12] , data streams sent from remote sites. For example, hurricane [13] , [8] have no problem in detecting the first packet or block forecasting [1] demands continuous and timely data input from loss. But once the first block or packet loss is detected, it many public data archives (such as satellite images and oceanic will result in uncertainty for them to continue authenticating changes from NOAA [2] ) to forecast the hurricane movement the rest data stream. It would be desirable to be capable of accurately. ADVFN [3] streams real-time stock prices, price detecting all packet or block loss and to continue the stream data, and stock charts from the New York Stock Exchange data authentication after detecting any packet or block loss.
to subscribed users. Audio and video based media communications (e.g., tele-conferencing, remote education, and
In this paper, we propose a novel application layer entertainment) are becoming ubiquitous today in our everyday stream data authentication method, DaTA (Data-Transparent life [4] . In many such network applications, the data integrity Authentication without Communication Overhead), to authenand authenticity need to be assured. For example, the receivers ticate data streams. Unlike all previous stream data authenof NOAA oceanic data want to make sure that the received tication schemes, our DaTA scheme embeds the MAC into data is genuine and has not been tampered with. Subscribers the inter-packet timing of the data stream. As a result, DaTA does not introduce any communication overhead' nor change that leverages the DCT transformation procedure. Lu et al. [7] the original stream content. By careful design of the MAC on proposed to combine the content authentication and ownership the data stream, our DaTA approach is able to detect multiple authentication. packet or block loss, and it can continue authenticating the rest Nevertheless, all existing strategies either embed informadata stream even if a packet (or block) loss has been detected. tion to the original content, or use out-of-band channels for This is in contrast to previous data stream authentication authentication information communication. Neither of these is approaches [12] , [13] , [8] .
required in our proposed scheme, in which covert channel [22] Besides analyzing the quantitative tradeoffs between the is leveraged to convey information. In addition, the hash authentication effectiveness and the bit error probability, we chaining used in DaTA avoids the authentication uncertainty have implemented a prototype of DaTA and we have empiri-upon data packet/block loss detection that exists in many cally evaluated the performance of our transparent stream data existing schemes. authentication scheme in a LAN. As with any other stream data DaTA is different from IPsec [23] , [24] , [25] in that it authentication schemes, our authentication scheme is subject focuses on authenticating the application layer streaming data, to malicious attacks such as packet drops and packet content rather than providing the data integrity and/or source authenmodification. Our experimental results demonstrate that with ticity at the IP layer. appropriate redundancy, our DaTA scheme is robust against packet loss and network jitter, and it is able to detect packet III. BASIC Existing work on stream data and multicast authentication on the received content for authentication. Thus, our proposed mainly uses message authentication codes (MACs) and secret-scheme consists of the BAC generation, BAC embedding/BAC key cryptography. The trivial solution is to generate a MAC per extraction, and BAC authentication. In this section, we depacket and send with the packet together. Various approaches scribe the details of these components, after which the packet [13] , [14] are proposed to lower the communication overhead boundary recognition issue is discussed with regard to packet by amortizing the authentication signature (MAC) where a loss, packet fragmentation, and out-of-order delivery. single digital signature is used for the authentication of mulTo present our scheme, we use the following notations. tiple packets. Gennaro Another line of work [6] , [9] , [11] , [15] was addressing
2) The length (in terms of bits) oflthe BA for each data the packet loss problem. In [11] , a MAC is appended to block is en every packet and the key of the MAC is provided in some 3) A hash function, denoted as H(X), is a one-way hash, subsequent packet. To tolerate packet losses, the keys are using an algorithm such as MD5 [26] or SHA [27] . generated by the means of a hash chain. In [6] , a directed 4) X,Y represents the concatenation of X with Y . acyclic graph is constructed and the hash of a packet is 5) A secret key, k, is only known to the communicating repetitively embedded into multiple packets so that packet loss parties; can be tolerated. Recently, Pannetrat and Molva [9] proposed 6) The origin of the data stream can be identified by a flag, to deal with packet loss using Erasure codes. Authentication which is f bits and only known to the communicating can be performed as long as a certain number of packets are parties, where 0 < f < nc received. Karlof et al. [16] proposed distillation codes to cope with packet loss and packet pollution. Authentication of multimedia and images has also been A. BAC Generation studied [17] , [18] , along the direction to protect the copyright Figure 1 sketches the BAG generation procedure. As inor the ownership of multimedia objects [19] , [20] . For the dicated in this figure, the BAG generation for data block i MPEG movie, Hartung and Girod proposed an approach [21] 
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> (1) B. BAC Embedding and Extraction
Once the BAC has been generated, it needs to be transfered 4_j03 W to the receiver of the streaming data so that the streaming o > =:;; data can be authenticated. Unlike most existing streaming (1) embedded. This step is shown as (3) in Figure 1 .
We randomly divide the 2r IPDs into 2 distinct groups of Note that for the first data block, a special second-digest (an equal size, and make sure that each IPD has equal probability Initial Vector -IV) must be agreed on by the communicating to be in group 1 and group 2. We use ipd l,k and ipd2,k parties. In this BAC generation algorithm, if we vary the value (k =1, , r) to represent the IPDs in group 1 and group of 6 while keeping the + f =n, we have different strategies. 2 respectively. Since each IPD has equal probability to be in group 1 and group2, IPDs in group 1 and group 2 are . d = 0: when d is 0, the strategy becomes easy and symmetric. Therefore, E(ipdl,k) = E(ipd2,k), and Var(ipdl,k) straightforward. There is no chain at all. It only demands -Var(ipd2k). dat bloc iniae tha the cu. n bloc is chage, it probability to be positive and negative.
'. We embed bit 1 by increasin Yr by a > 0 so that its means the hash value of the current block cannot be useda to authenticate the next block. Thus, the authentication probability to be positive will be greater than 0.5. Similarly, of~~~~~th.etbokadalis usqetbok ilb we embed 0 by decreasing Yr by a > 0 so that its probability uncertain. In addition, the protocol cannot distinguish the 2Please note that the BAC to be embedded is very different from the change of a data block and the deletion (or loss) of a data watermark in [28] , and the authentication based on BAC is completely new.
to be negative will be greater than 0.5. To increase or decrease authentication is successful, while the first part of the current Yr by a, we can simply increase or decrease each of the r Yk 's block authentication fails and the second part succeeds, some by a. To increase Yk by a, we can increase ipdl,k by a and data blocks between these two are lost/deleted. decrease ipd2,k by a. Similarly, we can decrease Yk by a by Through the above analysis, DaTA exhibits the following decreasing ipdl,k by a and increasing ipd2,k by a.
features:
Apparently the embedding is probabilistic in that there is a . It can detect any tampering, including content alteration small chance that the bit will not be successfully embedded.
and packet/block deletion; As shown in [28], the embedding successful rate can be made . It is able to locate the change to the data block level arbitrarily close to 100% with sufficiently large redundancy r.
so that in some circumstances, the application can make Assuming that the receiver shares the secret of which decisions (e.g. retransmission) accordingly; packets are used for encoding and decoding the BAC, we can . It is capable of ensuring that each block is authenticable calculate Y, at the receiver side from the timestamps of the even if any preceding data block is found to be changed. received packets. To extract an embedded bit, we check the In another word, it is not a fragile scheme;
value of Y,. If it is greater than 1, we decode the embedded . Besides authenticating the content itself, the scheme is bit as 1, otherwise, we decode the embedded bit as 0.
also able to authenticate the content source. This is due It is true that decoding a particular bit could be wrong due to the splitting of the authentication into two parts, where to the probabilistic nature of encoding and network delay jitter. discuss it in this section.
The comparisons consist Of two parts: the first part is on the first 6 bits, while the second is on the rest f (= n -6) bits.
To enable the receiver to delineate the data block boundary
Gonsidering the possible scenarios, Table I briefly summarizes at the sender side, the last packet of the previous data block the authentication result.
and the first packet of the current data block should be Note that in our scheme, every received data block can specially utilized. In our proposed scheme, the BAC bit is be authenticated independently, which is based on the f bits embedded by slightly adjusting the packet delivery time, so matching in the BAG comparisons. We always check this part if we intentionally add a sufficient large delay between these first. The first 5 bits can indicate whether the preceding data two packets (but still in the allowable range), this delay serves block is deleted or lost. Thus, as the boundary delineating purpose.
In our scheme, the normal inter-packet delay adjustment is 1) C2 is falsely determined to be equal to C; or Regarding the packet boundary, a particular concern comes 2) C2 is falsely determined to be different from C. from the effect of additional delay on the application's per-We regard the first case as a false positive, and the later case as formance in the proposed scheme. Since the additional delay a false negative. The [32] . Thus, we don't consider its 1 -pi effect in this study.
Let Xk be the probability that both C, and C2 (where C, C2) have exactly the same 0 < k < n bits different from IV. DaTA ANALYSIS C, and let Yk be the probability such that C2 have exactly
In DaTA, the authentication information is generated based 0 < k < n bits different from C, then we have on the content of the data block (see section III-A), which we n call content BAC. The BAC embedded to (or extracted from) Xk n pn k(l -
the inter-packet timing is called the reference BAC. At the receiver side, when the receiver receives the stream flow, the and reference BAC extracted from the inter-packet timing will be
used as a reference for the content BAC calculated from the packet content.
When 0 < Pi < 1, 0 < P2 < 1, the false positive rate is when P1 approaches 1, the false positive rate approaches 0. Therefore, it is desirable to make the reference BAC as robust B. Trade-off Between Redundancy Level and BAC Length as possible so that both the false positive and false negative
In the above, we have shown that an appropriate redundancy rates are small. This analysis result demonstrates the neces-level should be determined when the block size can vary. sity of enhancing the robustness of our basic authentication Under this condition, the block size should be kept relatively strategy.
small. In other situations, if a block size is limited or fixed, a Given any fixed P1 and P2, larger n will decrease the false new issue arises. positive rate as implied in Equation 6 . Besides the fact that Given a fixed data block size, increasing the redundancy the false positive rate decreases with the increase of n, there is level will increase the robustness of the extracted BAC bits, always a maximum value for the false positive rate for different thus increasing P1 in the above equation. However, with n. a limited number of packets in the block, increasing the Simply increasing the BAC length is not always possible. In redundancy level also reduces the number of BAC bits that the next section, we will introduce some other optimizations can be embedded. That is the BAC length. The BAC length for improving P1 and reducing delay impact to the applica-determines the collision rate and the false positive rate of tion's performance. the scheme. Thus, a longer BAC length is always desired. Clearly, increasing the redundancy level and increasing the BAC length have conflicting interests and thus must be well V. OPTIMIZATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS balanced. That is to say, when the block size is determined, a trade-off between block size and BAC length exists, and The analysis in the previous section shows that it is nec-an appropriate redundancy level should be used. This will be essary to increase the robustness of the reference BAG. The further evaluated in Section VI. accuracy of the reference BAC could be affected by many factors, such as network jitter, packet loss, adjustment size, C Bidirectionally Embedding A Bit and BAC length. Thus, it is necessary to optimize the basic design to make it practical. In this section, we discuss several So far to embed a BAG bit, we always increase the IPD issues and strategies for this purpose.
value of two packets. Intuitively, to embed bit 1, we always delay the first and the second packet of the first and second packet pair, respectively. That means those two packets are A. Redundancy Level sent a later than their original scheduled delivery time, while the other two packets are sent as usual. To embed bit 0, the In an ideal environment, where there is no network fluctua-second and the first packet of the first and second packet pairs tions, embedding a BAC bit using two packet pairs (4 packets) are sent with a delay. Based on the previous analysis, the larger is enough (redundancy level r = 1). For example, to embed the adjustment size a, the higher the accuracy. However, if a 24-bit BAC, we only need 96 packets if these packets are a is large, it may adversely affect the performance of some not repetitively used. A block size of 96 packets will make real-time applications. For example, for online video data locating a changed packet easier. This provides convenience authentication, a very large delay of the packet may cause and reduces cost for a remedy: if the application decides to the packet to be dropped, or cause the client to experience retransmit the tampered block, only 96 packets need to be playback jitter. Neither of these situations is pleasant. re-transmitted.
To alleviate the delay effect, an optimization can be done However, due to network fluctuations, a redundancy level as follows: to embed bit 1, we send the first packet in the first of 1 will make the embedded BAC error-prone since the BAC pair a later than its originally scheduled delivery time and the embedding in our scheme is probability based. An occasional second packet a earlier than its originally scheduled delivery large jitter could delay one of these packets, resulting in an time. For the second packet pair, the first packet is delivered error of the corresponding embedded BAC bit, and decreases a earlier while the second is delivered a later. Similarly we the authentication accuracy of our scheme.
can embed bit 0. According to Equation 3, the larger the redundancy level r, This optimization is constrained by buffer availability at the more centralized to 0 of the Yr distribution. In another the sender side and is thus advantageous only for some word, the instance of Yr will be more likely to fall into applications. If there is a non-zero-second buffer (such as [-a, +a] . Given a fixed adjustment size a, a large redundancy encoding buffer) at the sender side, this optimization can be level leads to a higher authentication accuracy. Thus, to make applied. our scheme robust, it is desirable to increase the redundancy level.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION But the higher the redundancy level, the more packets are
To study the effectiveness of our proposed scheme, we needed in a data block. For example, if the redundancy level is implemented a real-time Linux kernel based packet-level auincreased to 20 for the 24-bit BAG, at least 1920 packets are thentication prototype system. The system runs at the precision needed. If any ofthese packets is lost or tampered with, 1920 of 100 microseconds (the normal Linux system runs at the packets have to be retransmitted. Thus, we should always use 10 milliseconds) and is capable of online embedding and an appropriate redundancy level. We further explore this via extracting authentication information. Based on the prototype experiments in Section VI.
system, we first performed 5 sets of experiments in a local (and more controllable) network to study various aspects of fluctuations follow a uniform distribution for the video stream. our proposed scheme with artificially introduced network jitter In the figures, x-axis represents the networkjitter in ms, while and packet loss. The experimental results over the Internet are y-axis denotes the sum of false positive and false negative omitted due to page limit. Interested readers can refer to our (due to page limit given certain network jitter, the larger of the adjustment size, and 1 GB memory running our prototype system is set uip the smaller the error rate. If the maximum jitter is smaller than as a router, where the BAC bits are added before the data is the adjustment size, the error rate is always 0 or close to 0 streamed to the destination machine, which runs Windows XP in both cases. Note in Figure 3, Figure 4 shows the result. Roughly, jitter (1%) and the extreme case (100/o). A jitter probability adutmn sie do no aemc ifrne srpre of~~~~~~~~10 men amn 10 pakt ony1pce.srnol adjustment sizes do not make much difference. In our proposed scheme, the correct block boundary detec-wrong. Thus, it is important to increase the redundancy of the tion is the basis for authentication. The data block boundary embedded BAC so that our scheme can survive with dramatic is determined by examining and looking for the artificially network jitter.
introduced large inter-packet delay. A sufficiently large delay
First, experiments are conducted to find an appropriate indicates that a boundary is met. With the dynamics of network redundancy level for embedding authentication code to our fluctuations, it is possible that the network fluctuations may data streams. The basic BAC bits are 24 bits, and we set the affect the correctness of the block boundary detection. In adjustment size as 4mis. We only add BAC to adata block with addition, a packet loss or deletion may introduce large inter-2000 packets, so that different redundancy levels can be tested. packet delays.
Again, we artificially introduce data flows with the uniform First, in our experiments we study the impact of network and normal jitter with probabilities of 100 and 10000.
fluctuations. In these experiments, we set the block size as We define the error bit as the total number of error bits 100 and have 103 data blocks in total. Figure 2 and Figure 3 in the experiments in average. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show show the boundary detection error rates when the network the number of error bits when the redundancy level varies jitter follows a uniform distribution with and redundancy level should be found to achieve the best the maximum delay in the range of 1-10 ms and 100% packet authentication performance. jitter probability.
As discussed in section V-B, given a fixed data block size, D. Detect/Locate Content Change there is always a trade-off between the redundancy level and As aforementioned, the BAC in our scheme is content based.
the BAG length. They should be kept in balance. In the Ideally, when the content is changed, the extracted BAC should following experiments, we explore this by testing a data block not be consistent with the reference content BAC. However, if consisting of 1000 data packets. Given a block size of 1000 due to network fluctuations, the extracted BAG is also changed, packets, there are a few pairs of the redundancy level and BAC and is same as the new content BAC, a false positive happens.
length, including (6, 24), (7, 23) , (8, 20) , (9, 18) , (10, 16 ).
The following two experiments are performed to evaluate these Because the BAC length varies, when the network jitter situations by either deleting a packet, or changing a bit in a follows a uniform distribution in the range of I -10 ms with packet randomly. the probability of 1% and 100%, experiments are conducted Firstly, we run an experiment upon packet loss. For this test, to test the error bit rate. The error bit rate is defined as the we first embed BAC to the workload with the redundancy level total error bits of the 100 experiments divided by the product of 8 and the adjustment size as 4 ms for the 24 bit BAC. In of the BAC length and the number of experiments.
the embedded workload, we randomly drop a packet. We also When the packet jitter probability is 1%, the error bit rate is randomly perturb the embedded workload with network jitter always 0. When the packet jitter probability is 1000%, Figure 7 using the uniform perturbation where the max delay varies shows the error bit rate when the maximumjitter is inthe range from 1 to 10 ms and for each distribution. The experiment of 6-10 ins. When the maximum jitter is less than 6 ins, the runs for 10000 times for each jitter setting to randomly select error bit rate is always 0. a packet to drop. As shown in this figure, although in general the error bit rate Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the result when the jitter in approaches 0, a redundancy level of 10 clearly achieves the uniform distribution with 1%0 and 1000% probabilities. In these figures, the x-axis represents the allowed error bit. This means First, we watch the movie after it is embedded with the 24 how many erroneous BAC bits are allowed to be ignored. An bit BAC, redundancy level of 8, and an adjustment size of 4 ms allowed error bit of 0 means that all the 24 BAC bits must be when artificially introduced network jitter follows the uniform matched. An allowed error bit of 1 means that if only 1 bit or normal distribution with probabilities of 1% and 100%. We is different, the authentication is taken as a success. The y-did not observe any jitter even when we set up a 0-second axis represents false positive, which means a failure to detect buffer at the client side. To study the effect scientifically, and locate a dropped packet. It is expected that the larger the we conducted experiments to calculate the packet-timestamp allowed error bit number, the larger the false positive. Both difference and inter-packet-delay. figures indicate that unless the allowed error bit is very large Figure 11 shows the timestamp differences of the three (> 8), our scheme can always successfully locate a packet flows, represented by trial], trial2, and trial3. In trial], we change in a data block. Note an allowed error bit of 8 means did not embed BAC to the original data flow and captured the among the 24 BAC bits, 1/3 bits are not required to match. data packets at the client side. To reflect the network jitter in This is not commonly acceptable in normal applications.
our experimental environment, we repeated the playback and We further test without deleting a packet, but changing captured the flow as trial2. trial3 is the flow we captured at the the content of a randomly selected packet and repeated the receiver side after the original flow is embedded with BAC. experiment. The result shows the alteration can be detected Thus, the difference between trial] and trial2 indicates the with 100% accuracy, with the uniform distribution of 1% or local network jitter. The result indicates that network jitter in 100%.
our local experimental environment is trivial, and thus should not affect the correctness of our conducted experiments. The E. Authentication Accuracy difference between trial] and trial3 represents the experimental network jitter and the additional jitter introduced by our
The previous experiments have successfully determined that authentication scheme. As shown in the figure, 810% timestamp when the BAC length is 24, an adjustment size of 4 ms and difference for both scenarios falls into the same range, from a redundancy level of 8 are good for our experimental data -6 to 8 ms. This is trivial to the client side player, particularly streams. With these fixed parameters, the following exper-when these players normally have a non-zero second buffer.
iments are conducted to examine the accuracy, denoted as Figure 12 further shows the IPD values of the flow captured true positive, of our authentication scheme when the jitter on at the client with or without embedded BAC, denoted by packets comes with a 1% or 100% probability.
embedded and original. Our introduced BAC does shift the When the jitter follows a uniform distribution with a proba-distribution a little bit (about 1 ms) at the beginning. However, bility of 1%, our scheme always achieves 100% true positive. The largest portion of the IPD values is still around 15 ms. Thus, we only show the true positive for the authentication scheme when the packet jitter probability is 100% in Fig-VII . CONCLUSION ure 10. As shown in the figure, when the maximum jitter increases beyond 4 ms, our scheme cannot achieve a 100% Data streams have been commonly used in many Internet true positive. However, even when the maximum jitter is 10 applications, such as grid computing and streaming media. ms, our scheme still achieves a true positive above 9900.
More and more such applications demand a reliable and effective authentication mechanism to ensure the data streams transferred over the Internet are genuine. Although plenty of F: Impact on Applications research work has been conducted, existing work shares the Having experimented our scheme with different network characteristics of either sending the authentication information fluctuation distributions, block sizes, and redundancy levels, with the original data or out-of-band, which causes additional now we study the impact of our embedded BAG (delay) on communication overhead, particularly when the redundancy is sensitive applications, added to deal with packet loss, or embedding authentication which changes the original data. In this study, we propose a 
